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HARLEY J. McNEAL*
Every products liability claim must be investigated most care-
fully by defendant's counsel. The personnel of the corporation, part-
nership or individual who manufactures and sells articles for consump-
tion and use by the public have to be carefully questioned concerning
the identity of the product involved in the particular claim. After the
product has been identified, a minute inspection of the product has
to be made, as soon as possible. In this connection, defense counsel
should obtain the services of an expert to aid in the examination and
inspection of the product involved. Careful note must be made of the
circumstances under which the product is examined, and the location
of the product when the injury occurred if the product has been moved
from the place where the injury occurred. Colored photographs of the
product should be obtained, which localize the particular items of the
product which are the subject of the claim.
While the defense is generally behind the plaintiff insofar as in-
vestigation into the causes of the failure of the product is concerned,
defense counsel must overcome the time lag in investigation and must,
through careful questioning, checking, and tracing, produce a better
and more factual investigation than does counsel representing the
claimant. Careful inquiry must be made concerning quality control,
testing, improvements, parts defects, attitude of employees, safety
factors, shipping accidents, and the like, insofar as the particular prod-
uct is concerned. Counsel must consider the advisability of having
visual tests performed, as well as deciding whether films of various
tests made of the product or the manufacturing of the product can
be used as demonstrative evidence. Inquiry must be made to obtain
records of tests of the product made before marketing, and to ascer-
tain the number of claims received concerning defects in the product
after marketing. Looking toward defenses pertaining to warranties
and representations, if any, made by the manufacturer, consideration
must be given to having a scientific analysis made of the product, as
well as learning the methods used by the manufacturer to sell the
product.
Attention must be given to the background of the claimant with
the thought in mind of proving an assumption of risk defense or that
the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in the use of the product. In
the fabric and detergent cases, consideration must be given to the
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prior physical condition of the plaintiff, and inquiry must be made
into the plaintiff's background to ascertain if the plaintiff is allergic to
various chemicals or fabrics. Also, any physical defects of the plain-
tiff should be ascertained, with particular inquiry made into the plain-
tiff's eyesight, hearing, and ability to use the arms and legs normally.
The plaintiff's work record and "accident proneness" record must be
looked into. The plaintiff, through a deposition or witnesses, if a
deposition is not possible, must be checked concerning the facts in-
volved in the use of the product prior to, at the time, and after the
accident occurred. Information must be obtained as to how long the
product has been used, and how long the allegedly injured plaintiff
worked with the product or used it.
With the rapid advance in the number of cases being filed on be-
half of allegedly injured persons who claim to have been injured as a
result of failures in products, fabrics, or detergents resulting from
material defects or breaches of implied or express warranties, con-
sideration must be given to the vulnerability of manufacturers to the
"vouching in" principle. Where it can be proved that the manufacturer
is primarily liable, the principles of indemnity will apply, and the
"middle man" or retailer may "vouch in" the manufacturer when a
personal injury is claimed to have resulted from a breach of warranty
or material defect in the product, provided the "middle man" or re-
tailer has not changed the product nor advanced a different warranty
than that used by the manufacturer. In most cases, the "vouching in"
principle is applied where the product is sold subject to an implied
warranty of fitness and merchantability. In such cases, when the re-
tailer or "middle man" is sued by the allegedly injured user of the
product, the retailer or "middle man" can give notice of the claim or
lawsuit to the manufacturer and tender the defense of the lawsuit to
the manufacturer by placing the manufacturer on notice concerning
the claims made by the injured user. If the manufacturer refuses to
take over the defense of the lawsuit and the retailer or "middle man"
is held liable, then, in a subsequent action, the retailer or "middle
man" may sue the manufacturer. The manufacturer's liability is con-
cluded by the judgment previously obtained against the retailer or
"middle man" because of the "vouching in" principle. It holds that
since the manufacturer was duly notified of the lawsuit and was af-
forded the opportunity to defend same, the manufacturer is liable for
the amount of the judgment obtained, together with expenses and at-
torney fees.
In the case of Frank R. Jelleff, Inc. v. Pollak Bros., Inc.,1 the re-
tailer (Jelleff) sold a housecoat to defendant who was badly burned
1 171 F. Supp. 467 (ND. Ind. 1957).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
when the inflammable material of the housecoat caught fire. The in-
jured purchaser sued the retailer because of a breach of an implied
warranty of fitness and merchantability. The retailer notified the manu-
facturer of the lawsuit, and asked the manufacturer to defend the
case. The retailer told the manufacturer that if the injured purchaser
obtained a judgment against the retailer, the retailer would immediately
seek to be indemnified and would sue the manufacturer. The manu-
facturer of the housecoat refused to take over the defense of the case
filed against the retailer. The retailer was held liable to the injured
purchaser. The retailer then sued the manufacturer, and the court
rendered a summary judgment for the retailer against the manu-
facturer. The court held that the manufacturer sold the housecoat to
the retailer subject to an implied warranty of fitness and merchanta-
bility; that the retailer had given notice and tendered the defense of
the law suit to the manufacturer; that the retailer had been found
liable and had paid the amount of the judgment to the injured pur-
chaser; and that because of these facts the manufacturer was liable
for the amount of money paid out by the retailer to the injured pur-
chaser, together with the retailer's expenses incurred in defending the
lawsuit and attorney fees.
In a recent case decided by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,
Katherine Hessler v. The Hillwood Mfg. Co.,2 the court held as fol-
lows:
1. Nail manufacturer which was "vouched in," in nail buyer's
case against retailer for injuries from defective nail, and which
refused to defend was concluded by judgment rendered against
retailer in that case.
f 2. Where retailer paid judgment obtained against it by buyer
for injuries from defective nail and brought suit against manufac-
turer and offered independent evidence as to all essential elements of
case, retailer was entitled to recover from manufacturer even if
buyer's judgment against retailer were not conclusive ...
4. Nail manufacturer, -sued by retailer which paid judgment
in buyer's action against retailer for injuries sustained from de-
fective nail, could not question whether defense of buyer's case
against retailer, which manufacturer refused to assume, had been
skillfully handled.
In the trial of a products liability case, it is the duty and obliga-
tion of trial counsel to learn everything that can be learned about the
product involved. Counsel must be educated personally, and should
not attempt to have someone else make a technical investigation of the
2 302 F.2d 61 (6th Cir. 1962). Accord, St. Joseph & G. I. Ry. Co. v. Des Moines
Union Ry. Co., 162 N.W. 812, 816 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1917); Restatement, Judgments § 107
(1942); 1 Freeman, Judgments §§ 447, 448 (5th ed. 1925).
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product and attempt to glean that information from the investigator
and then try to present evidence to a jury about which he has no per-
sonal knowledge. Trial counsel should actually see the product, feel
it, and use it, or take it apart, if possible, depending upon the circum-
stances of the particular case.
If a manufacturer is being represented, distributors and retailers
of the product should be contacted to learn what they have said to
the users of the product in selling or recommending it. Information
should be obtained as to what the seller or distributor of the product
said about the product after the accident occurred.
All of the discovery tools available to trial counsel, including the
use of interrogatories and the taking of depositions, should be con-
sidered, so that at the time of trial counsel is certain he has all the
information it is possible to obtain concerning the product involved,
its use, and the claimed failure of the product.
The defense of contributory negligence should only be raised if a
strong case of such negligence can be made out. Assumption of risk
is probably the best psychological defense that can be raised in these
cases insofar as communication with the jury is concerned. The de-
fense of assumption of risk should only be argued if the investigation
is well documented and reliable so that evidence of the assumption of
risk can be comprehended easily by the jury, as well as difficult to
deny by the plaintiff.
The standard of care demanded of manufacturers of farm im-
plements is that of reasonable care in designing, selecting materials,
assembling, or doing anything that goes to the formulation of the
product. The same duty applies to manufacturers of fabrics and
detergents. It is such reasonable care that will fairly meet any emer-
gency of use which can reasonably be anticipated.3
A manufacturer or seller of a product has no duty to deal in a
"perfect" product, nor in a product which when used guarantees that
injury is totally impossible. Further, a merchant is not required to
sell only the latest or safest models of a product. Various models of
similar implements manufactured by different corporations may be
dissimilar in size or design, or in the number of safety devices pro-
vided. We are all aware of the fact that new models of products are
being placed on the market almost daily. Varied prices for the same
model of the product are asked, depending on the state of the economy,
and many other factors. Therefore, since the purchaser, in most cases,
exercises his personal choice or whim in making the purchase, there
3 Davlin v. Henry Ford and Son, 20 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1927).
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is no law requiring a merchant to offer only the latest models or only
those equipped with approved safeguards for sale.4
A manufacturer or seller is not an insurer of the products he sells.
He is not liable for injuries resulting from the use of a product due to
an unavoidable accident, or resulting from ordinary wear and tear.
A manufacturer of farm machinery cannot be held liable merely
because injuries are sustained by users of such implements. Common
knowledge tells us that injuries are frequently experienced by the
users of mowers, binders, threshers, tractors, corn shellers, hay loaders,
and other similar pieces of farm machinery.5
However, the particular machinery or product may be of such
nature that, in the exercise of ordinary care, the manufacturer has a
duty to the users thereof to equip such machinery or product with
various safety devices. A manufacturer may be liable for failure to
provide a shield or an emphatic warning as to the dangers involved
to users of an electric power saw.6 In such cases, however, the manu-
facturer is not required to equip the machinery with guards or other
safety features if it can be proved injury would only occur from a
known danger of which the user is well aware.
Although a lead pencil can stab a man through his heart or
puncture his jugular vein, a manufacturer of such a pencil has no
obligation to equip it with a safety guard. 7
There is no obligation on the part of a manufacturer to equip his
product with safety devices if, by a preponderance of the evidence, it
can be proved injuries sustained from the use of the machine were not
"probably" caused thereby, as opposed to the injuries "possibly"
being caused by the use of the machine.
Retailers are usually not required to inspect the products they
sell for the purpose of discovering any latent defects in the products.
Sellers of nationally known products being merchandised under trade
names do not have to inspect such products for defects which are
minimal or mechanical in nature. When it is proved a retailer neither
knows or has reason to know that the product he sells is, or is likely
to be dangerous, he cannot be held liable for injuries or damages
caused by its dangerous character. This is true even though the re-
tailer could have discovered the dangers had a reasonable inspection
been made of the product before it was sold. Further, the retailer
4 Kientz v. Carlton, 245 N.C. 236, 96 S.E.2d 14 (1957).
5 Stevens v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 151 Kan. 638, 100 P.2d 723 (1940); Heichel
v. Lima-Hamilton Corp., 98 F. Supp. 232 (N.D. Ohio 1951).
6 Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied,




cannot be held liable for a failure to properly inspect where it appears
the injury resulted from a defect in the product which inspection would
not have revealed. In addition, a retailer is only required to make a
reasonable inspection of products he sells in sealed packages as re-
ceived from the manufacturer. When the sealed package appears to
be in good condition and cannot be inspected further without opening
or breaking the container, the retailer is not required to open or break
the package to further inspect the product in the exercise of ordinary
care.
A manufacturer must use reasonable care and inspect the parts
manufactured by others which are used in his finished product. He
cannot rely upon the inspections or representations of the manu-
facturers of the parts to avoid liability to a user of the product if
the finished product fails after sale.' It is not enough for the selling
manufacturer to make reasonable tests; he must prove that the tests
were carried out in a careful manner, and as ordinarily expected and
accomplished by the employees making the inspections. Conversely,
unless a manufacturer can reasonably be said to be aware of the fact
that his product would be harmful if used for a purpose other than
that for which it is intended, the manufacturer is not required to in-
spect his product for ingredients or parts which would cause injury
under such circumstances.
The manufacturer's or seller's duty to warn users of a product
is not a mandatory duty which is required of all manufacturers or
sellers regardless of the nature of the product. A manufacturer or
seller must warn users of the product only when he has actual or con-
structive knowledge that its use involves dangers. In this case, he has
a duty to give reasonable and adequate warnings of the dangers in-
volved.
Dempsey v. Virginia Dare Stores9 was a suit against a retailer for
injuries sustained when a "Fuzzy Wuzzy" robe being worn by plaintiff
burst into flame. The robe was rayon and very fuzzy on the outside.
Plaintiff was smoking at the time. Appealing from an order refusing
to set aside an involuntary nonsuit, plaintiff argued that defendant was
liable because defendant knew, or by the exercise of ordinary care
should have known, that the robe was made of material which was
highly inflammable and was inherently dangerous to wear, and failed
to warn plaintiff of its dangerous qualities. The court said plaintiff
could not claim that she did not know what any ordinarily intelligent
person would know by observing the material, namely, that fluffy and
"fuzzy wuzzy" materials will ignite and burn more rapidly than ordi-
8 International Harvester Co. v. Sharoff, 202 F.2d 52 (10th Cir. 1953).
9 239 Mo. App. 355, 186 S.V.2d 217 (1945).
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nary cloth. There is no duty on the part of the seller of such a ma-
terial to notify the buyer of its inflammable qualities under the facts
of the case. The court pointed out that even if the robe had qualities
of inflammability and was of such character that the defendant should
have advised plaintiff thereof, there was no evidence in the case that
the defendant knew, or should have known, of such condition.
A seller of a dangerous product is charged with the duty of giving
the purchaser of the dangerous product a reasonable warning. The
warning must be understandable, strongly worded, and easily seen by
the user. The seller of the dangerous product bears the burden of any
ambiguity in the use of the warning language. In addition, the warn-
ing must be appropriate to the product. The more dangerous the
product is, the more certain the manufacturer must be that a warning
commensurate with the danger has been given to the users of the
product. The seller and manufacturer must be aware of the chances
of injury occurring, and must give a warning to the users which would
cause an ordinary user of the product to reasonably appreciate the
dangers in connection with the use of the product-and, in some cases,
the dangers involved in the misuse of the product.
Since a seller or manufacturer must give these instructions and
warnings by printed labels readily observable by the users, the seller
and manufacturer is responsible for the adequacy and truthfulness
of the instructions and warnings given, and is guilty of negligence
when the labels fail to properly and adequately inform the users of the
product of its dangers and proper use. The newspaper advertisements
used by the manufacturer or seller are now coming under close scrutiny
by counsel for both plaintiff and defendant. The representations set
forth in such advertisements must properly, reasonably, and ade-
quately advise the public of the uses and dangers involved, if any, and
the uses to which the product may be safely put. In the case of Oettinger
v. Norton Co."0 plaintiff sustained injuries when a spindle of a mounted
abrasive point, manufactured by defendant, broke while being operated
by plaintiff at high speed. The accident occurred because the point
was being operated at a speed in excess of its maximum safe speed.
Plaintiff claimed defendant failed to do all that it reasonably might
have done to give notice of the limitations of abrasive points. Plaintiff
said information as to the maximum speed at which the points could
be safely used should have been plainly marked either upon the product
or upon the container in which it was packed. Defendant said it was
impractical to warn users of the points as suggested, and displayed
pamphlets it distributed to users of the points containing information
10 160 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Pa. 1957), aff'd on op. below, 253 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1957).
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concerning the proper use of the product. It was clear defendant had
given plaintiff's employer all the information on the maximum safe
speed of mounted points necessary to insure their safe use, and the
court said that under Pennsylvania law defendant was not required
to do any more than it had done. The court found, in view of the
evidence, that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence since
plaintiff was fully aware of the danger in operating abrasive points at
excessive speeds. Plaintiff also knew there were notices and pamphlets
available to him in the shop where he did his work which showed the
safe operating speeds of wheels of various dimensions.
In Panther Oil & Grease Mjg. Co. v. Segerstrom," a property
loss was sustained as a result of a fire which occurred when plaintiff's
unskilled crew undertook to heat a product called "Battleship Roof
Primer," manufactured by defendant and sold through defendant's
agent. Heating was decided upon to make the primer soft so it could
be used on a roof. No warning of any kind was used on the containers
of the primer. An instruction pamphlet, relating expressly to "Battle-
ship Liquid Asbestos Roof Coating" and not referring to the primer
itself, was given plaintiff at the time of purchase. The instructions con-
tained a statement that "Battleship" should not be heated with an
open flame since when this is done "the waterproofing qualities of
Battleship are damaged . . . (and) a proper job is impossible." The
court rejected defendant's contention that plaintiff was guilty of negli-
gence in failing to heed the language of the instruction pamphlet, or
to show the pamphlet to his employees. The court held the pamphlet
actually said no more than that heating of the product would damage
its waterproofing qualities, and did not warn or suggest that heating
would or might produce a hazard of any sort other than heating would
make "a proper job impossible."
An action was brought on the theory of nuisance for the death of
a minor child when a "Gene Autry" cowboy suit worn by the child
caught fire. Plaintiff claimed that defendants manufactured and sold
the suit with inflammable chaps of pile rayon without warning the
purchasers or wearers of the suits of the danger from contact with
fire. The court said there could be no recovery against defendants on
the ground of nuisance. The evidence was that defendants had failed
to properly treat the material, or to warn the purchaser or wearer of
the child's suit of its inflammable nature. The court held this was
negligence, and not nuisance. 2
Injury caused by farm machinery has given rise to a number of
31 224 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1955).
12 Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 198 Misc. 291, 95 N.Y.S.2d 414 (Sup. Ct.
1950), aff'd, 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421, 37 A.L.R.2d 698 (1953).
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actions in which it was sought to hold the manufacturer or seller of the
machinery in question liable for the injury. Balers are among the
types of farm machinery which have been involved in such actions.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Wichman s was an action brought
for injuries resulting from plaintiff's hand and leg being drawn into
the compressing rollers of a hay baling machine. Plaintiff testified that
defendant's demonstrator-representative told him that whenever the
baling twine of the machine failed to engage with the rotating rollers,
he should stand on the frame of the machine and push the twine into
contact with the rollers by means of hay held in his hand. When plain-
tiff was injured, the hay he was using to push the twine into contact
pulled his hand into the rollers and his body was jerked up on the
conveyor so his leg was also pulled into the rollers. The court held
the trial court properly decided that the question whether defendant's
demonstrator-representative was guilty of a lack of due care in giving
directions and assurances to the plaintiff was one of fact, and not of
law. The court also said that whether plaintiff was contributorily negli-
gent in following the instructions allegedly given him by defendant's
demonstrator-representative presented an issue of fact, and not of law.
In the case of De Eugeno v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.14 plaintiff's
right arm was crushed between the rollers of a hay baler. Difficulties
in the operation of the baler were discovered upon delivery of the
baler. Defendant's employees tried to rectify the difficulties, and in
trying to make it operate properly, one employee would walk at the
left front tossing accumulated hay onto the chute. The hay would
accumulate in front of the chute, and this prevented a smooth flow of
hay into the chute and into the rollers. This caused the baler to lunge
forward or from side to side in an erratic manner. After observing
defendant's employee, plaintiff began walking along the left side of
the baler as defendant's representatives had done and was knocked off
balance by the baler, due to its erratic action. Plaintiff fell and was
carried up the chute, resulting in his arm being crushed. There was
sufficient evidence to support a jury finding of negligence on the part
of defendant's representatives.
Defendant's representatives had a definite duty to use due care
in instructing plaintiff as to the operation of the machine. It was for
the jury to say if plaintiff had been exposed to an unreasonable degree
of harm when he was told that the proper way to operate the machine
was to walk along near the left front of the chute in order to place
hay on the conveyor. There is no duty to warn against the obvious.
Defendant had no duty to warn plaintiff to stay away from the front
13 220 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 835 (1955).
14 210 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1954).
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of the chute, but even though there may have been no duty to warn
plaintiff to stay clear of the chute, there was a duty on the part of
defendant's representative not to direct plaintiff to place himself there
by representations that only by so doing could the baler be made to do
its work.
Defendant claimed it was incredible that plaintiff would interpret
what its representative did in adjusting the machine as an illustration
of the recommended manner of operation. In passing on this state-
ment, the court said plaintiff's credulity was not so great as to warrant
the conclusion, as a matter of law, that he was wholly unjustified in
taking the conduct of defendant's representative as a recommenda-
tion as to the proper manner of operating the hay baler. The court
also stated that conduct which might otherwise bar recovery as a
matter of law was to be looked at in a different light when, as in the
instant case, the seller's expert had indicated a proper way to operate
the machine to plaintiff who was injured because of the directions
given.
In an action filed against a farm implement dealer for injuries
when a lever attached to the baler suddenly became unlocked from a
groove in its anchor plate while plaintiff was operating it, striking plain-
tiff in the face, the Utah Court in Winchester v. Egan Farm Service,
Inc."; held that there was no liability. The baler was delivered to de-
fendant from the distributor fully assembled except for the lever and
its attaching parts, which were assembled by defendant before de-
livery to plaintiff. The plaintiff said defendant assembled the lever by
using a 3/8-inch anchor bolt inside a 1/2-inch hole in the sleeve. This
allowed so much up and down play in the lever attachment that the
locking pin could work loose and allow the lever to fly up. It was
decided that plaintiff could not recover on this theory of negligence.
The use of an anchor bolt larger than the 3/8-inch bolt recommended
might have been better, but since defendant received the baler fully
assembled, defendant had no responsibility or duty to plaintiff to re-
design the machinery. The designing of the machinery, the court said,
was an engineering job undertaken by the manufacturer, and defendant
was not negligent if he assembled the lever in accordance with such
design and the manufacturer's instructions.
In Yaun v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co."6 it was held the evidence
showed a hay baler, when used as intended, was not a thing of danger.
The injuries claimed by plaintiff resulted from a mistake in the method
of using the machine. Evidence as to protective devices employed by
other manufacturers of other machines which would gather grain was
11 4 Utah 2d 129, 288 P.2d 790 (1955).
16 253 Wisc. 558, 34 N.V.2d 853 (1948).
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held not to support a finding that similar protection could have been
devised for this machine. The other machines were not hay balers, and
thus could not be set up as a standard by which to test the duties of
the manufacturer of a hay baler to furnish a reasonably safe hay
baler.
A supervisor of inspectors for the state industrial commission said
that the machine, to be safe, required a quick-stopping device placed
alongside the incline leading to the rollers. It was extremely doubtful,
the court said, that such a device could have been utilized by plaintiff
since his fingers were caught in the roller as he fell and the rollers
traveled at the rate of six feet per second.
It was held in Despatch Oven Co. v. Rauenhorst that where the
seller of a corn dryer anticipated the dryer would only be used at a
temperature of 1800 to 200' Fahrenheit, which would involve no dan-
ger of fire, but the temperature was increased to twice the anticipated
amount by the purchaser, such acts constituted "extraordinary negli-
gence" and showed an utter disregard of safety. It was held the seller
could not reasonably be held to have anticipated such acts, and was
not responsible for the burning of a crib house.
It was further decided that the contract of sale set forth that the
seller "assumes no liability" for consequential damages of any kind
resulting from the use or misuse of the equipment. The court said the
language "assumes no liability" was held properly construable as mean-
ing that the seller "shall not be liable" and the term "consequential
damages," as used in the disclaimer, clearly extended to the loss re-
sulting from the germination of the seed corn due to insufficient drying.
In Strickler v. Sloan 8 a manufacturer was not found to be liable
for failing to install a guard over open trash rollers of a corn picker.
The absence of a guard was not a latent and concealed danger. The
court held a manufacturer is not under the duty of making an accident-
proof or foolproof machine. Further, a manufacturer is not under a
duty to guard against injury from a patent peril or a source openly
dangerous.
In Johnson v. West Fargo Mfg. Co.'9 an employee of the purchaser
of a grain elevator manufactured by defendant was struck and killed
when the elevator collapsed. The employees of the purchaser, together
with the employee killed, assembled the elevator. They determined the
cable used to raise and lower the elevator was not properly installed.
They then lowered the lift arms used to support the auger tube of the
elevator until the lift arms reached stop hooks located near the dis-
17 229 Minn. 436,40 N.W.2d 73 (1949).
18 127 Ind. App. 370, 141 N.E.2d 863 (1957).
19 255 Minn. 19, 95 N.W.2d 497 (1959).
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charge end of the auger tube, thereby allowing the cable to slack off so
the cable could be restrung. When the cable slacked off, the stop hooks
were the sole support of the auger tube. The stop hooks would only
support about fifty pounds and the tube, which weighed 950 pounds,
fell on decedent and crushed him. The instructions furnished by de-
fendant for assembly of the elevator did not caution against only us-
ing the stop hooks to support the auger tube. Conversely, such use of
the stop hooks was not recommended or urged in the instructions. It
was held that whether, in restringing the cable, decedent should have
found some other means of supporting the auger tube, and was negli-
gent in assuming that the stop hooks would support the weight of the
tube was a question of fact to be decided by the jury.
Another question of fact for the jury to decide was whether de-
fendant should have anticipated the dangers arising out of the process
of restringing the cable, and was negligent in not instructing the pur-
chaser specifically how to restring the cable. When a manufacturer
sends printed instructions instructing as to the proper use to be made
of the product, the manufacturer is also responsible for giving accurate
and adequate instructions with respect to the dangers likely to result in
its improper use, the court said.
In the case of Lovejoy v. Minneapolis Moline Power Implement
Co.,2 0 the court discussed the introduction of evidence to the effect
that the manufacturer could have used material which would have
made the end product more safe. The court held that the manufacturer
might be liable not only for negligence in the design and construction
of the product, but also for the failure to give warning of dangers in-
herent in the use of a product that had apparently been carefully made.
The court said:
Such a manufacturer also may be liable if he knows or should
know that the chattel is apt to cause bodily harm if not used in a
specific manner if he fails to furnish adequate warning as to the dan-
gers inherent in its use. If the manufacturer indicates by printed in-
struction to advise of the proper use to be made of a chattel, he as-
sumes the responsibility of giving accurate and adequate instructions
with respect to the dangers inherent in its use in some other manner.21
A most novel defense was advanced in the case of Chapman v.
Brown22 where plaintiff borrowed a hula skirt to attend a masquerade
20 248 Minn. 319, 79 N.W.2d 688 (1956).
21 Id. at 325, 79 N.W.2d at 693. Other cases upholding this view are: Hartmon v.
National Heater Co., 240 Minn. 264, 60 N.V.2d 804 (1953); Schlottman v. Pressey, 195
F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1952); Wright v. Carter Products, 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957);
Tingey v. E. F. Houghton & Co., 30 Cal. 2d 97, 179 P.2d 807 (1947). See Dillard and
Hart, "Products Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty to Warn," 41 Va. L. Rev. 145
(1955).
22 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962).
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party. She was seated when the skirt caught fire, probably from a
lighted cigarette deposited on the floor where she was seated. De-
fendant claimed the use of the skirt by plaintiff was not contemplated
at the time the skirt was purchased. The purchaser of the skirt was
shorter than the user of the skirt. Also, defendant said it did not con-
template the user of the skirt would seat herself on the floor at a party
attended by a number of people who were drinking and smoking. The
court held a jury question as to negligence on the part of the seller of
the skirt was presented. The court held that the jury was entitled to
find the seller must have been aware the skirt might be loaned out to
friends attending social functions where there would be drinking and
smoking. The jury could also find that the difference in size between
purchaser and user of the skirt did not constitute a use or purpose
different from that contemplated between the seller and purchaser
since the skirt would have been on the floor if the purchaser would
have seated herself.
An interesting Pennsylvania case decided in 1958,23 held a plain-
tiff could amend a complaint designating the manufacturer of a farm
tractor as defendant to permit plaintiff to proceed against the named
defendant as a distributor of the product. The court said:
I believe that a farm tractor is a chattel which is inherently dan-
gerous since it is a machine which carries with it harmful poten-
tialities when negligently or defectively constructed. It must be
exposed, demonstrated and inspected in order for the manufacturer
to satisfy the distributor that it is a saleable product and for the
distributor to satisfy the retailer as to why said chattel is an accept-
able marketable product. 24
Evidence that other users of the same product suffered no injury
may be introduced to aid in proving the product involved was not
actually harmful. In this connection, defendant must prove identical
circumstances and length of time the product was in use. It must be
proved the user of the product was an average, ordinary individual.25
It is well known and recognized that products will deteriorate and
fail from prolonged use without the manufacturer of the product being
negligent. It is axiomatic that no manufacturer is duty-bound to pro-
duce a product which will not wear out as a result of normal wear
and tear. Most courts, however, hold that even though it can be proved
that a product has been safely used for a prolonged period of time, the
23 Fleming v. John Deere Plow Co. of Syracuse, 158 F. Supp. 399 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
24 Id. at 400.
25 Parker v. Gulf Refining Co., 80 F.2d 795 (6th Cir. 1936), wax used for sealing
jars; Simmons v. Gibbs Mfg. Co., 170 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd, 275 F.2d
291 (6th Cir. 1960), design of a toy.
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manufacturer may be held liable under the facts of the speciAc cases.
It has been held that defectiveness is a fact question to be resolved by
a jury.26
The court in the New York case of Gomez v. E. W. Bliss Co. 2
7
dismissed an action brought because of a failure of a power press.
The failure occurred after the machine had been in operation for al-
most nine years. The evidence indicated that little attention had been
paid to maintaining and servicing the machine, contrary to the manu-
facturer's instructions furnished with the machine.
The court commented that the manufacturer had no duty to
furnish a machine that would not wear out. Furthermore, the court
said that common sense dictates that machines be inspected periodically
and worn parts replaced; a duty which rested on plaintiff's employer,
not on the manufacturer. The court distinguished this case from those
involving the malfunction of a newly acquired machine.2 8
Three Ohio cases are interesting and pertinent:
1. Witlam v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co.,2 9 wherein the Court
held, as follows:
In an action for damages for injuries caused by eating biscuit
made from flour sold to a consumer by a retail grocer, which flour
allegedly contained deleterious matter, including glass, where both
the presence of the foreign matter in the flour, and the cause of
injuries, if any, are in dispute, a finding by the jury in favor of the
grocer, in the absence of interrogatories, will not be disturbed on the
weight of the evidence....
The defendant's evidence tended to show that the foreign
materials could not have been in the flour when purchased, as the
sack is automatically filled at the mills from bins through a chute
to which the bag is attached and then sealed; that the shipment
is in car lots and distributed to the chain of retail groceries of the
defendant company; and that at the time of the purchase the bag
was still tied with the miller's knot. Some evidence was put in
challenging the veracity of some of the plaintiff's witnesses. From
this it is plain that in the absence of direct proof the inferences
must be drawn by the jury. It was also the province of the jury to
pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, all bearing upon the
question of whether the glass and other substances were in the flour
when sold.
26 Hartlich v. General Motors Corp., 10 F.R.D. 380 (N.D. Ohio 1950), truck which
had been used for two weeks before flywheel broke; International Derrick v. Croix, 241
F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1957), derrick which had been used for seven years; McNamara v.
American Motors Corp., 247 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1957), defective steering column jacket.
27 27 Misc. 2d 649, 211 N.Y.S.2d 246 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
28 Id. at 651, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 648. See Beckhusen v. E. P. Lawson Co., 9 N.Y.2d
726, 174 N.E.2d 327, 214 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1961).
29 51 Ohio App. 499, 1 N.E.2d 949 (1935).
1963]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
2. Mente v. Albers Super Markets, Inc.,"° wherein the Court
held, as follows:
The burden of proof rested upon the plaintiff to prove that the
wiener actually contained a foreign substance, so that evidence
by the manufacturer detailing the method of processing and manu-
facture of the particular wiener involved seems logically to be
material, relevant and probative on the likelihood of any foreign
substance getting into the product during such processing and
manufacture.
The sole testimony that the wiener contained a foreign substance
coming from the plaintiff and her mother-in-law, it became the pecul-
iar province and duty of the jury to judge of the credibility of those
witnesses in determining the ultimate fact to be proved.
The proffered evidence reflecting on defendant's claim that it
was impossible for a foreign substance to get into the product during
processing and manufacture seems likewise material, relevant and of
probative force in aiding the jury in its duty of determining the credi-
bility of the witnesses.
3. The Dow Drug Co. v. Nieman, et al.,"1 wherein the Court
held, as follows:
It is undisputed that Nieman purchased four cigars at the store
of The Dow Drug Company, took them home with him, and on the
same day proceeded to smoke one of them, when it exploded, causing
substantial physical injury. These cigars were taken from a box of
cigars that had been purchased by The Dow Drug Company from
The S. Frieder & Sons Company. The evidence shows that the ex-
plosion was caused by a fire cracker that was inside the cigar ...
The case was submitted to the jury on the theory that if the
plaintiff had proven that he had purchased the cigar from The Dow
Drug Company, that it was not of merchantable quality, and that
he was injured by reason thereof, he was entitled to recover against
the company. This was the correct theory and there was abundant
evidence to sustain the verdict for the plaintiff.
The judgment in the plaintiff's favor against The Dow Drug
Company will, therefore be affirmed.
The trial court made the liability of The S. Frieder & Sons Com-
pany turn on whether the cigar sold by it to The Dow Drug Company
was reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was purchased, or
whether The S. Frieder & Sons Company was negligent in failing to
properly inspect the cigar that it sold to The Dow Drug Company,
knowing it was to be resold to the company's customers. While there
is evidence that The Helena Cigar Company manufactured this cigar,
the evidence disclosed that The S. Frieder & Sons Company marketed
it as its own product, and therefore was properly held to such
responsibility as might attach to it as the original manufacturer.
30 92 Ohio App. 152, 109 N.E.2d 527 (1951).
31 57 Ohio App. 190, 13 N.E.2d 130 (1936).
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Whatever negligence there was in the original manufacture must be
attributed to it.
That there is a liability upon a negligent manufacturer who sells
articles knowing they are intended for resale to sub-purchasers is
clear from the trend of modern authorities. The only controversy is
as to the basis of the liability, some holding that the implied warran-
ties are made for the benefit of the sub-purchasers and form the basis
of liability, and others holding that there must be proof of negligence
to impose a liability.... (Citations omitted.)
In the case at bar there can be no doubt that there was evidence
of negligence in the manufacture of this cigar. In fact the evidence
indicates that it was the intention to make it defective as a cigar by
the insertion of a firecracker in it. Under such circumstances the case
was properly submitted to the jury, and as the charge authorized a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff on both the theory of implied warranty
and negligence, there was no error prejudicial to the plaintiff in the
instruction.
A manufacturer must exercise ordinary care in performing rea-
sonable tests and making regular inspections to determine whether his
product is dangerous. In the case of Northern v. General Motors
Corp.3"2 the court held that defendant was in no position to argue that
a fracture in a steering mechanism was not reasonably discoverable
since the technique of X-raying steel and other methods of testing
steel had been recognized, and were available to the defendant.
In a forward-looking dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Jackson, in
the case of Dalehite v. United States33 wrote:
This is a day of synthetic living, when to an ever-increasing ex-
tent our population is dependent upon mass producers for its food
and drink, its cures and complexions, its apparel and gadgets. These
no longer are natural or simple products but complex ones whose
composition and qualities are often secret. Such a dependent society
must exact greater care than in more simple days and must require
from manufacturers or producers increased integrity and caution as
the only protection of its safety and well-being. Producers cannot try
out drugs to determine whether they kill or cure. Consumers cannot
test the youngster's cowboy suit or the wife's sweater to see if they
are apt to burst into fatal flames. Carriers, by land or by sea, cannot
experiment with the combustibility of goods in transit. Where experi-
ment or research is necessary to determine the presence or the degree
of danger, the product must not be tried out on the public, nor must
the public be expected to possess the facilities or the technical knowl-
edge to learn for itself of inherent but latent dangers. The claim that
a hazard was not foreseen is not available to one who did not use fore-
sight appropriate to his enterprise.
32 2 Utah 2d 9, 268 P.2d 981 (1954).
33 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
1963]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
In the case of DiVello v. Gardner Machine Company,34 the court
held as follows:
The principle that the manufacturer or seller of goods is liable
for injuries to persons due to defects therein, is not limited to things
which, in their normal operation, are implements of destruction, but
if the nature of the thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place
persons in peril when negligently made, the liability attaches, irre-
spective of contract, for failure properly to inspect and discover de-
fects, coupled with knowledge of probable danger therefrom....
A grinding wheel designed to be revolved at high speed is a dan-
gerous instrumentality if it contains a latent defect which causes it
to disintegrate upon ordinary use and a workman injured in such
may recover against the person who sold the wheel to his employer
on the basis that it is negligent to sell such an instrumentality and
that contemplation must be had for the usage to which it will be put
and the liability of injury to those using it.
Courts have universally held evidence of prior accidents and
prior failures of function may be considered by the jury even though
the circumstances surrounding the prior accidents or malfunctioning
are not shown.
In a case in Virginia involving a child's death resulting from
drinking furniture polish,85 the court admitted evidence of 32 cases
of chemical pneumonia involving the consumption of the polish. Four
of those 32 cases involved children who died from drinking the polish.
The court held:
In order to 'prove their case plaintiffs had to show a duty to
warn which the defendants had violated. To do this it was necessary
to show that defendants knew, or should have known, that the prod-
uct was being used, or might be used, in a dangerous manner, that is,
that it was, or might be, drunk by humans. To do this plaintiffs might
have relied upon the application of the rule of reasonable care under
the circumstances to the facts that an innocuous looking deadly poi-
son was coming into the environment of the home and thus into close
proximity to children. But the plaintiffs might also try to raise a
duty to warn by the additional method of proving that the defendants
had actual knowledge (emphasis by the court) that the product was
subject to misuse, that is, human consumption. Out of a super-abun-
dance of caution counsel for plaintiffs, not content to rest its case
on the first ground, chose to buttress it by proof of actual knowledge
of the danger by the defendants.
These admissions do no more than show defendants' actual
knowledge of thirty-two instances in which their product had been
consumed by humans. The only similarity of those instances with
the present case required is that the product was drunk by humans
and that it caused chemical pneumonia. If the defendants knew (em-
84 102 N.E.2d 289 (C.P. 1951).
35 Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962).
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phasis by the court) that their product was being drunk with harmful
consequences, they had a duty to warn, whether it was being drunk
by adults or children, regardless of the circumstances, for then there
is but one answer to the question of foreseeability.
The only problem involved in the question of the admissibility
of this evidence is one of relevancy. It has long been established that
such evidence is relevant to prove knowledge.386
Plaintiff, a child five years old, sued to recover damages for burns
sustained when her pajamas were ignited while she was standing in
front of an open gas heater in an apartment which her parents had
rented from defendants. On an appeal by plaintiff from the sustaining
of a demurrer to the amended complaint, without leave to amend, the
judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of California in Hanson
v. Luft.3 7
The settled rule, as stated by the court, is "that while a landlord
is under a duty to warn the tenant of any hidden danger or defect in
the leased premises of which he has knowledge, there is no duty to
warn the tenants of obvious and patent dangers and defects. . . . If
the defect is known to the tenant and the tenant fails to protect his
invitee against it, the tenant may be liable but the landlord is not."
The danger from the open gas heater was deemed "a patent one"
which was covered by the settled rule.
The amended complaint alleged that "defendants had a similar
previous experience with the same heretofore described appliance in
the same location and premises, wherein another minor child was
burned." Plaintiff contended defendants, by reason of this experience,
had knowledge of the danger not possessed by her parents, and that
while the danger to an adult was patent, it was a latent danger to her.
The court stated "this attempted distinction flies in the face of com-
mon knowledge" and concluded:
It has been held in a number of cases in other jurisdictions that
where premises are let to the parents of children with conditions exist-
ing which present a patent and obvious danger of injury to such
children the duty of protecting the children from such obvious dan-
gers rests upon the parents who have elected to become tenants of
such premises with knowledge of the condition of the danger to their
children; and that the landlord cannot be held liable for injuries
suffered by the children from such obvious and patent dangers. The
parents of this five-year-old child must have been aware of the fact
that the danger to the child from this open flame was greater, because
of her immaturity, than it would be to an adult, and that they must
for that reason exercise the proper and necessary care to protect her
from its dangers.
30 Id. at 88.
37 58 Cal. 2d 443, 374 P.2d 641, 24 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1962).
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Courts also have generally held that evidence of changes in design
or in the product itself after the date of an accident is inadmissible to
prove fault. In an action for injuries sustained while using an auto-
matic washing machine, plaintiff claimed defendant was negligent in
design and construction of the washing machine, in that it had failed
to equip the machine with a safety braking device which would bring
the tub or basket to a stop when the mechanism on the machine in-
dicated that it was "off," or when lid was lifted. She also claimed that
defendant was negligent in failing to adequately warn her of the fact
that the tub or basket of the machine continued to spin rapidly after
the machine showed "off," and after the lid was lifted.
Prior to commencement of trial, plaintiff proposed to offer in
evidence in the trial the fact that, subsequent to her accident, de-
fendant had made certain changes in its washing machines by installing
a braking device, which brought the spinning tub or basket to a stop
when the machine was shut off, and a locking device on the top cover,
which prevented its being opened until the tub or basket had ceased
rotating. The court ruled that this proposed evidence, relative to the
changes defendant made in its washing machines subsequent to the
accident, was not admissible on the ground that such evidence was not
proof of its alleged negligence before and at the time the accident hap-
pened. Plaintiff contended that she should have been allowed to show
these changes that defendant made in its machines subsequent to the
accident, not as evidence of its negligence, but as evidence of the
practicability or feasibility of incorporating such safety devices on its
automatic washing machines. There are cases which support plaintiff's
contention here .3 However, Sixth Circuit, in holding evidence was
properly excluded, merely cited Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Glenn L.
Martin Co., 9 also holding such "hindsight" evidence to be inadmis-
sible.40 The court did not discuss plaintiff's claim of negligent failure
to warn. But in the Minnesota case of Rosin v. International Harvester
Co.41 the court discussed a replacement part which was superior to a
part on the original product as it came off the assembly line and said
the jury could consider this evidence, and "could conclude that the
manufacturer should have in the first place installed a grease seal of
the design and quality of the replacement part."
In addition to evidence of the product being defective or danger-
38 See 1 Frumer & Friedman, Products Liability, § 12.04 (1960).
39 224 F.2d 120, 50 A.L.R.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 937 (1956).
40 Cox v. General Electric Co., 302 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1962).
41 115 N.W.2d 50 (Minn. Supp. Ct. 1962). Cf. Steele v. Wiedemann Machine Co.,
280 F.2d 380 (3d Cir. 1960).
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ous, plaintiff must be able to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the manufacturer or distributor had knowledge at the time they
had possession or control of the product it was or would be defective,
dangerous or harmful.42
The courts hold that evidence of a product being broken or de-
fective after an injury has been sustained is not conclusive of the issue
of proximate cause. It is for the jury to consider whether such evi-
dence is proof of proximate cause, since the jury could find the broken
or defective condition did not exist just prior to the injury having been
sustained.43
Here it is believed important to distinguish between claims of
negligence and liability for breach of warranty. Negligence arises
when the manufacturer or purveyor of the product involved fails to
exercise ordinary care so that as a proximate consequence of this
"fault" injuries and damages result. Warranty is not grounded upon a
failure to use ordinary care or wrongdoing. Liability for a breach of
warranty comes about when the product fails to perform or does not
come up to the manufacturers' or suppliers' claims for the product,
whether these claims or representations be express or implied. Thus,
fault is not the basis of a warranty case for the failure of a product.
Proof by the manufacturer or supplier of the absence of negligence and
exercise of ordinary care is of no importance in warranty cases. Gen-
erally such evidence is not admissible. 44
An express warranty is a positive assertion made by a manu-
facturer or supplier of a product pertaining to the performance of the
product. It is a positive affirmation of a fact or promise made concern-
ing the capabilities of the product.45
In the Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co. case,46 the court
stated its holding was "opposed to the present weight of authority,"
but nevertheless held the petition stated a cause of action for breach
of an express warranty because:
42 Darling v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 171 Cal. App. 2d 713, 341 P.2d 23 (1959);
Wolden v. Deering, 105 Minn. 259, 117 N.W. 493 (1908); Hofstedt v. International Har-
vester Co., 256 Minn. 453, 98 N.W.2d 808 (1959); and Dunn v. Ralston Purina Co.,
38 Tenn. App. 229, 272 S.W.2d 479 (1954).
43 Lovas v. General Motors Corp., 212 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1954); O'Donnell v.
Geneva Metal Wheel, 183 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1950); and Heichel v. Lima-Hamilton,
supra note 10.
44 Rasmus v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 158 F. Supp. 70 (N.D. Iowa 1958); Brown v. Globe
Laboratories, 165 Neb. 138, 84 N.W.2d 151 (1957); and Uniform Commercial Code
§ 2-314, comment 13 (1958).
4G Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-313 (1958).
46 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
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Today, many manufacturers of merchandise, including the de-
fendant herein, make extensive use of newspapers, periodicals, sign-
boards, radio and television to advertise their products. The worth,
quality and benefits of these products are described in glowing terms
and in considerable detail, and the appeal is almost universally di-
rected to the ultimate consumer. Many of these manufactured articles
are shipped out in sealed containers by the manufacturer, and the
retailers who dispense them to the ultimate consumer are but conduits
or outlets through which the manufacturer distributes his goods. The
consuming public ordinarily relies exclusively on the representations
of the manufacturer in his advertisements. What sensible or sound
reason then exists as to why, when the goods purchased by the ulti-
mate consumer on the strength of the advertisements aimed squarely
at him do not possess their described qualities and goodness and
cause him harm, he should not be permitted to move against the
manufacturer to recoup his loss. In'our minds no good or valid reason
exists for denying him that right. Surely under modern merchandising
practices the manufacturer owes a very real obligation toward those
who consume or use his products. The warranties made by the labels
on his products are inducements to the ultimate consumer, and the
manufacturer ought to be held to strict accountability to any con-
sumer who buys the product in reliance on such representation and
later suffers injury because the product proves to be defective or
deleterious. 47
An implied warranty holds the supplier of goods liable to pur-
chasers because the supplier, by placing the goods on the market, by
operation of law, represents that such goods are usable, or are reason-
ably fit for the particular purpose for which they are offered.
The case of Chapman v. Brown says this concerning implied war-
ranties:
This is a case in which, although the latter was not specifically
mentioned during the trial, there was both an implied warranty as
to quality and fitness for use, and an implied warranty of merchan-
tability, which were identical as to fitness of the skirt for use as an
article of clothing. (Emphasis added.) It is the court's firm belief
that any article of clothing, such as a hula skirt, which is so highly
flammable as to be dangerous to life and limb, is defective and un-
suitable for the use for which it was sold, and selling the same would
be a breach of both implied warranties of quality and fitness, and
merchantability.48
In the Missouri case of Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co.,5 °
plaintiff had purchased a detergent from local retail merchants for
47 Id. at 248-249, 147 N.E.2d at 615-616.
48 198 F. Supp. 78, 94 (D. Hawaii 1961).
49 Supra note 22, at 94.
50 241 Mo. App. 114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952).
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use in a restaurant. The petition alleged a breach of warranty, stating
that the preparation was warranted to be fit and safe for use in wash-
ing dishes. The package had printed on it the statement, "And, of
course, Tide is kind to hands, too." The court, although reversing a
judgment allowing recovery, held that recovery was not barred by
lack of privity of contract between plaintiff and defendant. Representa-
tions made by a manufacturer of products such as "Tide" were said
to be inducements to buyers making a purchase of the product, and
were to be regarded as warranties imposed by law, independent of
the manufacturer's contractual intentions. The liability thus imposed
upon the manufacturer, the court said, springs from representations
direct to the ultimate consumer, and not from the breach of any con-
tractual undertaking on the part of the manufacturer. Defendant's
contention that the evidence failed to show that plaintiff relied upon
the alleged warranty was rejected, the court saying that it was not
necessary for plaintiff to show by direct evidence that she relied on the
warranty, it being sufficient if from the circumstances shown, reliance
thereon fairly appeared.
It was pointed out that the warranty was printed on the box of
"Tide," and related to a subject likely to attract customers and induce
a purchase, and plaintiff made no investigation of the ingredients of
the product, nor did she rely upon information furnished by others.
The court pointed out that the general rule is that no proof of the
buyer's reliance on the warranty is necessary other than that the seller's
statements are the kind which naturally would induce a purchase.
The case of Pabellon v. Grace Line, Inc." involved an explosion
which resulted when a sailor had mixed a quantity of caustic soda or
lye, sold under the name of "Dearborn Cleaner No. 7" and used for
cleaning drains, "Pride" washing powder, oxalic acid, and a cleanser
sold under the brand name of "Oakite." A third party complaint was
filed against the suppliers of these cleansers and detergents and the
manufacturers. The court said that "there would appear to be at least
a possibility of liability against the suppliers for breach of warranty
and against all the defendants for negligence." With respect to the
contention that there could be no claim upon breach of warranty inso-
far as products sold under their trade names were involved-the ap-
plicable New York statute specifying that in the case of a sale of a
special article under its patent or other trade name there is no implied
warranty as to its fitness for any particular purpose-the court held
that this argument overlooked the settled construction of the statute
to the effect, first, that the fact that an article happens to have a trade
51 191 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 893 (1951).
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name does not, per se, bring the sale within the provision of the statute,
and second, that even if it does, the statute does not necessarily ex-
clude a warranty of merchantability. A purchase under a trade name
does not mean the purchaser is not relying on the skill and judgment
of the seller or on the belief that the article will perform a particular
function.
The Ringstad v. I. Magnin & Co. case52 dealt with the purchase
of a summer cocktail robe which caught fire when it came into contact
with a burner of an electric stove. The court held a retail sale of wear-
ing apparel was within the comprehension of a statutory provision to
the effect that where a buyer expressly or by implication makes known
to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required,
and relies on the seller's skill or judgment, there is an implied war-
ranty that the goods are reasonably fit for such purpose. It was clear
an article of wearing apparel is to be worn and that such purpose must
have been known to defendant seller. Plaintiff relied on defendant's
skill and judgment in determining whether the garment was reasonably
fit for the required purpose, since she said that although she examined
the robe for color, texture, size, style, and design, she was totally and
wholly uninformed as to the resistance of the fabric to flame or fire.
She claimed she relied wholly and exclusively on defendant to market
merchandise which was fit for the purposes for which it was intended,
and which was safe for public use.
The court held, further, that plaintiff was not barred from re-
covery as a matter of law on the ground that her injury had been
sustained by reason of an improper use of the article. Defendant said
that the garment was a long, loose, flowing, more or less elegant, gar-
ment, intended primarily to be used in the home during leisure hours
"under conditions where people would be expected to sit down and
enjoy a drink rather than be working in a kitchen." The court said
that although it would not rule that the use made of the cocktail gown
in the instant case was proper, the propriety of the use made of the
garment was, on the facts presented, a question for the trier of facts.
Under the common law, the manufacturer of chattels was not
liable for breach of an implied warranty unless there was privity of
contract. This general rule is followed in a majority of states, but like
the hearsay rule, it has been riddled with exceptions. The most noted
exceptions are found in cases involving foodstuffs where almost all the
courts hold the manufacturer liable for breach of warranty that goods
are fit for human consumption. Another exception pertains to those
articles which are inherently dangerous. A third exception, followed
52 39 Wash. 2d 923, 239 P.2d 848 (1952). Accord, IngaUs v. Meissner, 11 Wisc. 2d
371, 105 N.W.2d 748 (1960).
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in many states, is found where the purchaser relied upon representa-
tions made by the manufacturer in advertising materials or on labels.
These representations are the crux of the warranty regardless of the
contractual obligations of the vendor.
The trend in many areas is away from the general rule, and this
is pointed up in the most recent decisions.
The interesting case of Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co.
declares:
A prevalent but mistaken notion is extant that the term, war-
ranty, has always carried the implication of a contractual relation-
ship. From a historical standpoint such notion is without foundation.
Some of the cases, and well known and respected writers on legal
subjects, point out that originally the consumer or user of an article,
which was represented to be in good condition and fit for use and
proved not to be, was accorded redress by an expansion of the
action of trespass on the case to include deceit-a fraudulent
misrepresentation-which sounds distinctly in tort. Undoubtedly,
the recognition of such a right of action rested on the public policy
of protecting an innocent buyer from harm rather than to insure
any contractual rights ...
Other writers have no hesitancy in asserting that in the
beginning an action on "breach of warranty" was a tort action to
give relief for the breach of a duty assumed by the seller, and that
the introduction at a much later date of the method of declaring on
a warranty indebitatus assumpsit (an implied promise or obligation
on the part of one to pay to another what in fairness and good con-
science the former should pay) constituted the recognition of an
additional or alternative remedy of a contractual aspect to secure
relief where a breach of warranty is involved.53
The now famous land mark case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., held as follows:
[U]nder early common law concepts of contractual liability only
those persons who were parties to the bargain could sue for a breach
of it. In more recent times a noticeable disposition has appeared in a
number of jurisdictions to break through the narrow barrier of privity
when dealing with sales of goods in order to give realistic recognition
to a universally accepted fact. The fact is that the dealer and the
ordinary buyer do not, and are not expected to, buy goods, whether
they be foodstuffs or automobiles, exclusively for their own consump-
tion or use. Makers and manufacturers know this and advertise and
market their products on that assumption; witness, the "family" car,
the baby foods, etc. The limitations of privity in contracts for the
sale of goods developed their place in the law when marketing condi-
tions were simple, when maker and buyer frequently met face to face
on an equal bargaining plane and when many of the products were
relatively uncomplicated and conducive to inspection by a buyer
53 Supra note 46, at 247, 147 N.E.2d at 614-615.
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competent to evaluate their quality.... With the advent of mass
marketing, the manufacturer became remote from the purchaser, sales
were accomplished through intermediaries, and the demand for the
product was created by advertising media. In such an economy it
became obvious that the consumer was the person being cultivated.
Manifestly, the connotation of "consumer" was broader than that
of "buyer." He signified such a person who, in the reasonable con-
templation of the parties to the sale, might be expected to use the
product. Thus, where the commodities sold are such that if defectively
manufactured they will be dangerous to life or limb, the society's
interests can only be protected by eliminating the requirement of
privity between the maker and his dealers and the reasonably ex-
pected ultimate consumer. In that way the burden of losses conse-
quent upon use of defective articles is borne by those who are in a
position to either control the danger or make an equitable distribution
of the losses when they do occur....
[I]t is our opinion that an implied warranty of merchantability
chargeable to either an automobile manufacturer or a dealer extends
to the purchaser of the car, members of his family, and to other per-
sons occupying or using it with consent. It would be wholly opposed
to reality to say that use by such persons is not within the anticipa-
tion of parties to such a warranty of reasonable suitability of an
automobile for ordinary highway operation. Those persons must be
considered within the distributive chain. 54
By proceeding in warranty, as indicated above, the plaintiff does
not have to prove negligence, and also is entitled to take advantage of
reasonable inferences which the jury 'may find from circumstantial
evidence.
In a case involving a defendant who manufactured chemical
resins, marketed under the registered trademark "Cyana," used by
textile manufacturers to process their fabrics so as to prevent shrink-
age, plaintiff, a manufacturer of children's knitted sportswear, bought
large quantities of fabrics thus treated from middlemen fabric manu-
facturers, licensed by defendant to treat their fabrics with "Cyana,"
and to sell under defendant's label, 5 In purchasing such Cyana-treated
fabrics, plaintiff relied upon representations made by defendant in its
sales literature and other advertising, and also the labels or garment
tags furnished by defendant. These labels read, "A CYANA Finish-
This Fabric Treated for Shrinkage Control-Will Not Shrink or Stretch
Out of Fit-Cyanamid." After most of the fabrics purchased by plain-
tiff had been made up into garments and sold, it was discovered that
ordinary washing caused them to shrink and lose their shape.
54 32 N.J. 358, 379-384, 414, 161 A.2d 69, 81-84, 100 (1960). Accord, B. F. Goodrich
Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959); Hansen v. Firestone Tire and Rubber
Co., 276 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960).




The court disregarded the lack of privity, and affirmed denial of
a motion for summary judgment by defendant. The court mentioned
the changes in relationships in the marketing field, and the reliance
placed on direct-to-consumer advertising by manufacturers as reasons
for this holding.
While some state courts (Kansas, New York and Oregon) apply
the statutory limitations referable to contract actions, most courts
apply the statutory period used in personal injury cases to cases
brought for alleged breaches of warranties."'
While contributory negligence and assumption of risk are recog-
nized as legitimate defenses in negligence cases involving products,
many courts will reject these defenses when they are advanced in
products cases brought on complaints of breaches of express or implied
warranties except when it can be proved the plaintiff used the product
improperly.5 7
In Frier v. Procter & Gamble Distributing Co.58 the court held
that there was no error in rendering judgment on the record for de-
fendant. There was no evidence that plaintiff ever complained to her
employer that the product ("Tide") was causing her hands to be in-
jured. She never asked for something else to be used in its place. She
continued to use the product for more than three months. All during
this period she obtained salve or ointment from a drugstore, and re-
ceived treatment from a doctor. Other witnesses who testified with
respect to the irritating qualities of the product had stopped using
it when they found it was affecting their hands, and their trouble had
ceased.
Skeptur v. Procter & Gamble Distributing Co.59 was an action for
injuries allegedly sustained as a consequence of the use of defendant's
detergent, "Tide." Plaintiff claimed dermatitis developed from the use
of the product. An expert witness stated that the eruption on plaintiff's
hands could have been caused by "Tide." There was evidence, however,
that plaintiff used other soaps and detergents at her home and at the
place of her employment. The court affirmed a judgment in defendant's
favor, holding that proximate causation was not shown. The question
of the cause of the dermatitis was said to involve scientific and medical
56 Seymour v. Union News Co., 349 Ill. App. 197, 110 N.E.2d 475 (1953); Finck v.
Albers Super Markets, 136 F.2d 191 (6th Cir. 1943) ; and Baatz v. Smith, 361 Mich. 68,
104 N.W.2d 787 (1960). See Annot. 37 AL.R.2d 703 (1954).
57 Lake v. Emigh, 118 Mont. 325, 167 P.2d 575 (1946); De Graf v. Anglo California
Nat. Bank, 14 Cal. 2d 87, 92 P.2d 899 (1939); Northwest Airlines v. Glenn L. Martin Co.,
224 F.2d 120, 229 F.2d 434, 50 A.L.R.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1955). See 38 Am. Jur., Negligence
§ 188 (1941); 65 C.J.S., Negligence § 119 (1950); Dillard and Hart, op. cit. supra note 21.
58 173 Kan. 733, 252 P.2d 850 (1953).
59 261 F.2d 221 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1003 (1959).
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facts beyond plaintiff's knowledge or experience, and the testimony of
plaintiff's expert witness failed to develop a prima facie case. The
court did not say that "Tide" was a more probable cause of the derma-
titis than the other soaps or detergents used by plaintiff.
In Shaw v. Calgon, Inc., 60 plaintiff claimed injuries sustained as a
consequence of her hands coming into contact with defendant's de-
tergent "Calgonite," intended for use in automatic dishwashers. Plain-
tiff went to the kitchen sink and reached for a product known as
"Calgon," but mistakenly picked up a box of "Calgonite." She poured
some of the "Calgonite" into a pail of hot water, and began to wash
venetian blinds. She immediately felt a burning sensation. She looked
at the box, and found she had used the wrong product. She examined
the box for information regarding an antidote printed on the "Cal-
gonite" package, but could not find such information. She did read
that the product was highly alkaline. There was evidence that the box
contained a statement that it was not to be used for tasks "involving
contact of the hands with the wash water," and although the "Calgo-
nite" could be used for certain cleaning tasks apart from dishwashing,
the user should avoid "contact of the hands with Calgonite solutions."
The court held in defendant's favor and rejected plaintiff's conten-
tion that defendant could be charged with liability for failing to state
on the "Calgonite" box the nature of the contents of the product, and
an antidote therefor. It was said that defendant could not reasonably
have been required to do more than give specific instructions for the
use of its product and a warning against allowing it to come in contact
with the hands. There was said to be no authority for the proposition
advanced by plaintiff that a manufacturer of detergents is required, in
addition to giving proper directions as to use and a warning of possible
injury, to state on the container both the chemical nature of the con-
tents and the antidote or neutralizing agent to be used in case of in-
jury. Plaintiff's failure to exercise due care, under the circumstances,
also barred her recovery. She blindly reached out for a box of "Cal-
gon," and did not look to see what box she actually had in her hand.
She proceeded to pour an unspecified amount into the pail of hot
water and to permit the solution to come in contact with her forearms,
all of which proved her negligence.
Most of the product cases turn on proof of negligence or on
breaches of warranties on the part of the suppliers of the product. Not
many cases (in proportion to the number filed) involve the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur. Presently, it appears the courts are not extending
the doctrine. The requirements of control and possession are strictly
60 35 N.J. Super. 319, 114 A.2d 278 (1955).
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adhered to, except in a few isolated cases where the facts are un-
usual.
The court in Ford Motor Co. v. Wolber6" held that defendant
could not be found liable for failure to give notice of the tendency of
a tractor to turn over, where there was no evidence that there was
such faulty design and construction of the tractor as to give rise to
such a tendency. After purchasing the tractor, the injured plaintiff's
employer had installed a governor thereon and two additional rear
wheels. The court held the res ipsa loquitur doctrine did not apply
because the tractor was not the same as the one sold by defendant, and
because it was proved the tractor was in regular use for over two years
without having overturned. These facts indicated to the court that
something which was done to the machine after it had passed from the
manufacturer's custody and control was responsible for the accident.
In the Lovejoy v. Minneapolis-Moline Power Implement Co.6
the court held that plaintiff was not entitled to invoke the rule of res
ipsa loquitur. The court said the doctrine would be used only where
the apparent cause of an accident is such that defendant would be
solely responsible for any negligence connected with it. In this case,
the accident was unexplained and could reasonably be attributed to one
or more causes for which defendant would not be responsible.
In Cunningham v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,63 involving an explosion
of a beverage vending machine, plaintiff's experts testified that hy-
drogen was liberated in the tank and ignited by electricity. Defendant's
experts testified that they found sodium hydroxide splattered on a
nearby window, and if the explosion were caused by the ignition of
hydrogen, there would be no residue of sodium hydroxide. Defendant
claimed that the explosion was caused by someone placing sodium in
the lid of the machine so that it fell into the water when the lid was
opened. Inasmuch as the explosion was held to be equally attributable
to a cause for which defendant would not be responsible, res ipsa
loquitur was inapplicable."4
In conclusion, it must be stated that what has been set forth above
is only a minute sampling of the myriad of cases involving the use of
61 32 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 565 (1929).
62 Supra note 20.
63 87 Cal. App. 2d 106, 198 P.2d 333 (1948).
64 Other cases dealing with res ipsa loquitur are: Miller v. Steinfeld, 174 App. Div.
337, 160 N.Y.S. 800 (1916); Haas v. Carrier Corp., 329 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App.
1960); Reynolds v. Natural Gas Equipment, 184 Cal. App. 2d 724, 7 Cal. Rptr. 879
(1960); Hammerschmidt v. Ford Motor Co., 192 Cal. App. 2d 3, 13 Cal. Rptr. 274
(1961); Mabe v. Huntington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 145 IV. Va. 712, 116 S.E.2d 874
(1960) ; Schafer v. Wills, 171 Ohio St. 506, 172 N.E.2d 708 (1961) ; and Lyons v. Jahncke
Service, Inc., 125 So. 2d 619 (La. App. 1960).
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products. The complexities of our expanding intelligence in the fields
of engineering, chemistry and other related sciences, leads us to the
inevitable conclusion that products litigation will require every active
negligence lawyer to acquire as much knowledge as possible within
these special scientific fields in order that clients will be served ade-
quately and properly.
Concepts of liability and responsibility are changing almost daily.
New ideas and theories are ever clamoring for attention, requiring the
trial lawyers to be ever alert and properly prepared to argue for or
against such novel theories and ideas as may be developed, to the end
that justice is done in this field of the law.
